

избежать волнений на Яике, почему и находился в постоянном диалоге с казаками, а также старался сдерживать епархиальные власти, в их деятельности по искоренению старообрядчества [1, с. 340–341]. В вопросе распространения староверия среди яицких казаков, центральные духовные и светские власти склонялись к политике «невмешательства», приоритетной задачей было сохранение дееспособного войска. В тоже время, после розыска начала 1750-х гг. власти опасались спровоцировать волнения.

Примечания:

- 1 В источниках он фигурирует как Дионисьев, а в книге Н. С. Соколова как Денисов.
- 2 Позже епископ предлагал назначить вместо солдат для охраны отставных казаков.
- 3 Последний разделил мнение епископа о необходимости иметь «ученого протопопа в войске» [7, с. 19]
- 4 Видимо, после Максима Павлова протоиереем стал Петр Дионисьев.
- 5 О том, было ли это осуществлено, в источниках не говорится.

Библиографический список:

1. Витевский В. Н. И. И. Неплюев и Оренбургский край в прежнем его составе до 1758 г.: в 3 т. Казань Типо-Литография В. М. Ключникова, Большая Проломная, соб. дом, 1897. Т. 3. IV, 617–974 с.
2. Карпов А. Б. Памятник казачьей старины. Краткие очерки из истории Уральского войска. Уральск. ТОР. 1992. 108 с.
3. Полное собрание законов Российской империи. Собр. 1-е. СПб. Типография II Отделения Собственной Его Императорского Величества Канцелярии. 1830. Т. 14. № 10.460. С. 419–420.
4. Российский государственный исторический архив. Ф. 796. Оп. 36. Д. 257.
5. Романюк Т. С. Начало распространения староверия среди яицкого казачества // Известия УрФУ. Гуманитарные науки. 2016. Т. 18. № 3 (154). С. 235–236.
6. Соколов Н. С. Раскол в Саратовском крае. Опыт исследования по неизданным материалам. Поповщина до пятидесятих годов настоящего столетия. Саратов. Тип. И. П. Штерцер и К. 1888. V, XXIV, 480 с.
7. Сперанский И. Ограничения церковного самоуправления Яицкого войска в прошлом столетии // Оренбургские епархиальные ведомости. 1897. № 1. 1 января. Неоф. ч. С. 17–25.
9. Чернавский Н. Оренбургская епархия в прошлом ее и настоящем. (Труды Оренбургской ученой архивной комиссии. Вып. X). Оренбург. Типография Оренбургской Духовной Комиссии. 1901–1902. Вып. 2. 1058, XIV с.

Lubna Saeed

MODERNIZATION AND ISLAM

Abstract. This article is based on the theory of modernization with bond of tradition and religion in context of Islam and Islamic societies by various modernists. Early scholars argued that modernity and tradition to be mutually exclusive. On the other hand, Most of theorists' defined modernity and tradition as antagonistic forces but the idea was repealed in 1960s with a theory of relationship between religion (Islam) and modernity which justified that modernity and tradition can coexist and no longer contradictory. Islam has been taken to justify this theory in this article. It is usually supposed that Islam is hurdle in modernization and development. The article attempted to refute the view that Islam is hostile to modernity. The reason for developmental fail is western model of institutions which built have not rooted in, but often contrary to social and religious values that command the allegiance of the masses. It has been end up with a conclusion that modernity cannot be defined absolutely as secularization in case of Islam.

Keywords: modernity, tradition, secularization, islam.

In the period after World War II, the modernization school emerged as the most celebrated theoretical framework for the understanding of the third world in western social science. The modernization school saw post-colonial societies in a stage of transition from tradition to modernity, following the inauguration of colonial reforms and the installation of colonial institutions. This transition from tradition to modernity, resulting from colonial reforms and institutions, was perceived as part of a unilineal historical route of development originating in the Western European experience.

Early modernization scholars saw tradition and modernity to be mutually exclusive. The antagonism between tradition and modernity dates as far back as the Enlightenment. Marquis de Condorcet's unilineal vision of progress condemned the past as use less and saw hope for human progress in the future. Also, Karl Marx's version of Enlightenment, as expressed in his idea of dialectical conflict of material interests, repudiated the past and saw hope in future revolutionary change. Basing themselves on such assumptions, most scholars of third world development conceptualized modernity and tradition to be two antagonistic forces.

The assumption that tradition and modernity were contradictory rested on, as Lloyd and Susann Rudolph observed, «Misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them» [12, p. 3].

Such misdiagnosis of tradition and modernity was corrected, first, by cultural anthropologists in the mid-1960s who saw that traditional societies were not as malleable as the early modernization theorists had thought. Development in one sphere, such as technology, did not necessarily bring concomitant changes in other spheres of the indigenous social system [6, p. 277]. On the other hand, the mere destruction of traditional values and institutions, such as family and community, did not ensure the development of a new and viable modern society. Rather, quite often the destruction of traditional forms tended to lead to disorganization, delinquency, and chaos instead of a viable rational order [3, p. 99].

Critics also found that kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, communal bonds, which are typical forms of association in a traditional social order, did not entirely disappear even in the most highly industrialized societies [11, p. 326]. Moreover, later research revealed that modernity incorporates traditional aspects while traditional forms incorporate, at least, latent, deviant, or minority values, configurations, and structures that may fit a model of modernity [12, p. 5, 12]. Hence, modernity and tradition were found to be complementary and compatible. Not only that, revisionist scholarship also discovered that modernization does not necessarily mean development. According to this view, development refers to the institutionalization of modernity into traditions of national and cultural life. Without such institutionalization, modernization of a subsystem, for example, the military, may prove dysfunctional unless accompanied by the simultaneous growth of civil responsibility and tradition of an appropriate civil-military relationship [5, p. 287, 288]. Hence, it can be said, as Kothari argues: «Modern society is characterized by a belief in the rational and Scientific control of man's physical and social environment and the application of technology to that end. One could thus define the process of modernization as one of secularization....» [6, p. 289].

In a similar vein, another author observed that in the process of transition from traditional societies to modern nation states, «The increasing secularization of society also exacts its toll on traditional religious beliefs, even though ritualized practices may continue long after they have lost their primary meanings. Defenders of traditional religions are confronted not only by the apathy of many who find little satisfaction in the ancient beliefs and practices, but also by a minority who view the traditional religions as definite obstacles to modernization» [4, p. 109–113].

By the late 1960s, however, the prevailing view on religion and modernity came to be questioned from within the modernization school. Some prominent modernization theorists recognized the adaptability and elasticity of traditional values and institutions as also their capacity to provide a meaningful basis for political integration and legitimation. As already observed, modernity and tradition no longer appeared as necessarily contradictory; now, it seemed that they could coexist.

The worldwide resurgence of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s made the relationship between tradition and modernity more complex. Modernization was supposed to have eliminated religion from public life. Instead, what occurred was a revival of religion as a political force, particularly in the Islamic world. The response to this problem, from the western perspective, has been that what has happened in the Muslim countries is the abandonment of modernity and that is what explains the resurgence of Islamic.

First of all, the lack of modernization in the Islamic world cannot be attributed to Islam. Both quantitative and qualitative studies on Islamic societies refute the view that Islam is hostile to modernization. El. Manoufi found in his survey of Egyptian villagers that Islam did not hinder development as generally assumed in western social science. The findings indicated, as El. Manoufi observed:

“Islam, embodied in religiosity, exercises no negative impact upon development. This contradicts the notion that Islam is responsible for the backwardness of Muslim societies and poses an obstacle to overall development. Religiosity, as the practical understanding of Islam, is a neutral factor in its relationship with development: it neither hinders nor furthers it [2, p. 148–156].

On the other hand, as Ragab contended: «Backwardness resulted from serious disruptions in the social organization of these societies by foreign domination for long periods. The stunted political, economic and social institutions of these societies are incapable of serving the needs of the population in a meaningful way. Genuine development of institutions in accordance with the sharia was halted for centuries. Foreign institutions that run against Sharia's principles are imposed on people who experience a continuous acute conflict between what they hold to be the truth in their conscience and a dismal statuesque» [10, p. 519].

As a result, western models of development failed because the institutions they built have not been rooted in, but are often contrary to, social and religious values that command the allegiance of the masses [Ibid., p. 520].

On the other hand, it can be argued that it was not Islam but colonialism which made the Muslim countries (and the third world in general) underdeveloped. At the time of colonization there was not a very big gap between European states and many Afro-Asian countries in terms of economic infrastructure, accumulation of capital and the general standard of living. But such gaps had become very wide by the time of colonial withdrawal, as has concisely been noted in the context of India: «What is striking is the fact that at the beginning of British rule, India and Great Britain were at roughly equivalent levels of economic well-being, but by the 20th century the latter was a developed industrial country while the former not only remained primarily an agricultural country but also, with its integration into the world economic system as an agricultural dependency, subjected to great economic fluctuation

and consequent grave economic distress. ... the development of Great Britain is related – and it could not but be related given the two economic systems were so closely integrated – to the underdevelopment of India» [8, p. 110].

Another perspective is that, while modernization and Islam are accommodative, Islamic modernization is not similar to secular-oriented western modernization. As Fazlur Rahman, a contemporary authority on Islam, has argued: «It should be noted that Islamic modernism is not equivalent to secularism, even though so many western... political scientists... identify the two. They assume that all modernization is secularization, which is palpably untrue in case of Islam» [13, p. 160].

James Piscatori observed, in the same vein, that the view that Islam stifled the process of development owed much to Marx and something to Durkheim, who related nation-building to secularization. According to Piscatori, the recent experience of the Islamic world demonstrated a great deal of development under the leadership of orthodox Muslim elites, such as Saudi Arabia, as well as radical ones, such as Libya and Iran [9, p. 117]. Thus development could take place under Islamic leadership. On the other hand, substantial modernization does not necessarily lead to secularization. For example, Iran in the 1960s and 1970s experienced extensive modernization, including substantial investments in heavy industry and infrastructure, urbanization, expansion of literacy and formal education, growth of communications and mass media [1, p. 302]. But these modernizing achievements failed to establish secular values and institutions. It can therefore be contended, as Ali Banuazizi does, that: «The structural changes accompanying modernization do not necessarily bring about secularism, either at the level of political institutions and processes or in the attitudes and values of individuals who have been exposed to modernizing experiences» [1, p. 305–306].

Conclusion. Thus, the view that lack of modernization opened the space for a resurgence of Islam in the socio-political sphere is indefensible. On the other hand, it is true that rapid modernization tends to evoke opposition from traditional forces, and this conservative reaction results in the resurgence of traditional values and movements. But Islamic resurgence is not a phenomenon limited to only those societies that have experienced rapid modernization, such as Iran; it also pervades societies with a low level of modernization, such as Pakistan. This has been so because the Muslim masses are in a quest for authenticity in the wake of the failure of, and conflicts caused by, alien models of development. They do not want transplantation of western institutions. Rather, they want to adapt them to Islamic norms or innovate their own ones in accordance with Islamic tradition. Hence, it is important to look for causal relationships beyond either the lack of modernization or the presence of rapid modernization in investigating the reversal in the state ideology of Pakistan from secularism to Islam.

Bibliographical references:

1. Banuazizi. Social Psychological Approach to Political Development.
2. E. I-Manoufi K. Islam and Development: A Field Study / Taw fie E. Farah and Yasumasa Kuroda, Political Socialization in the Arab States. Boulder : Lynne Rienner. 1987. P. 148–156.
3. Eisenstadt S. N. Tradition, Change, and Modernity. New York : John Wiley. 1973.
4. Geertz C. The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States // Old Societies and New States: The Quest of Modernity in Asia and Africa. New York : Free Press. 1963. P. 109–113.
5. Huntington S. P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven : Yale University Press. 1968.
6. Kothari R. Tradition and Modernity Revisited // Government And Opposition. Vol. 3. No. 3. Summer 1968.
7. Lerner D. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York : The Free Press. 1958.
8. Nayar B. R. India's Quest for Technological Independence: Policy Foundation and Policy Change. Vol. 1. New Delhi : Lancers Publishers. 1983.
9. Piscatori J. Islam in a World of Nation-States. New York : Cambridge University Press. 1984.
10. Ragab A. A. Islam and Development // World Development. Vol. 8. No. 7/8 (July/August). 1980. P. 519.
11. Reinhard B. Tradition And Modernity Reconsidered // Comparative Studies In Society And History IX. No. 3. April. 1967.
12. Rudolph L. I., Rudolph S. H. The Modernity of Tradition – Political Development in India. Chicago, London : The University of Chicago Press. 1967.
13. Rahman F. Islam and Political Action: Politics in the Service of Religion / eds. Biggar N., Scott J. S., Schweiker W. / Cities of Gods — Faith, Politics and Pluralism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press. 1986.